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FRANCO-BRIT ISH RE LA TIONS AT SEA AND OVER SEAS
A Tale of Two Na vies 
Alexandre Shel don-Duplaix
In 2009, fi nan cial re stric tions forced France to close its na val attaché of fice inLon don, the job be ing trans ferred to an other sailor, the ad mi ral who serves as
France’s de fense attaché in the United King dom. Paris’s first na val attaché across
the Chan nel had been posted un of fi cially in 1856 and for mally four years later.
Back then, the two com pet ing em pires in Af rica and in the East had many shared 
in ter ests, be it to keep the Rus sians out of the Med i ter ra nean and fight the Cri -
mean War, sup press the slave trade in the Gulf of Guinea, open China to their
trade, or to work to gether to pro tect their na tion als and their in vest ments over -
seas. Dur ing the Amer i can Civil War, Paris and Lon don had closely co or di nated
their pol i cies to as sess and fi nally ac cept the Un ion block ade against the South.
The two na vies also planned for a pos si ble con fron ta tion with the North or its
stra te gic part ner, Rus sia, in the af ter math of the Pol ish insurrection in 1863. At
the same time, Lon don was en vi ous of France’s famed na val en gi neer Dupuy de
Lôme and his Gloire-type ar mored frig ates. Brit ain
had em barked on an am bi tious pro gram to even tu ally 
re claim its lead er ship in na val tech nol ogy, while sell -
ing to France steam en gines and shar ing ex per tise in
na val gun nery. As a ju nior en gi neer, Dupuy de Lôme
had worked in a Brit ish ship yard—an other ex am ple
of com pe ti tion and co op er a tion al to gether.1 
One hun dred fifty years have elapsed, and ex cept
for the ero sion of Brit ish na val might, the rel a tive sit u -
a tions of the two coun tries and their na vies are not all
that dif fer ent. Two fu ture sixty-six-thou sand-ton
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Queen Eliz a beth air craft car ri ers should even tu ally al low the Royal Navy to de -
ploy larger plat forms than the sin gle forty-four-thou sand-ton French car rier
Charles de Gaulle. Like the ar mored frig ates of the 1860s, the Brit ish car ri ers
were or dered with an ur gent con cern not to be sec ond to the French in terms of
cap i tal ships and ton nage, es pe cially when it co mes to choos ing a flag ship for an
al lied force.
TWO OLD COM PET I TORS WITH COM PA RA BLE STRA TE GIC
IN TER ESTS
On the stra te gic level, the sit u a tions of the United King dom and France are com -
pa ra ble. Their econ o mies are on a par, as are their de fense bud gets, at £40.4 bil -
lion (2.5 per cent of gross na tional prod uct) and €42.52 bil lion (2.6 per cent),
re spec tively. The strengths of Brit ish and French mil i tar ies are close, at 240,200
and 250,582 men, re spec tively, in clud ing 39,320 and 42,866 for their sea ser -
vices. Their geostrategic her i tages, com mit ments, and ap proaches are very sim i -
lar. As Cap tain Jean Nicolas Gauthier, France’s last na val attaché in Lon don,
ex plains, “Brit ain and France share the same nos tal gia of a lost gran deur and
have their own par tic u lar views on the world.”2 Both the United King dom and
France have na tional in ter ests that jus tify de ploy ing forces out side of NATO.
Their mil i tar ies are shaped for force pro jec tion on a na tional ba sis. De spite Lon -
don’s 1967 vo cal with drawal from “east of Suez” and its fo cus on NATO, the
United King dom re mains pres ent over seas through the Com mon wealth. Out -
side the United King dom, Eliz a beth II is the queen reg nant of fif teen in de pend -
ent sov er eign coun tries: Aus tra lia, Can ada, New Zea land, Ja maica, Bar ba dos, the 
Ba ha mas, Gre nada, Pa pua New Guinea, the Sol o mon Is lands, Tuvalu, Saint Lu -
cia, Saint Vin cent and the Grenadines, Belize, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Antigua
and Barbuda. Like wise, France re mains po lit i cally in flu en tial within many of
the twenty-eight French-speak ing coun tries.
Other Eu ro pean na tions have been in creas ingly ac tive in Af rica, Iraq, Af -
ghan i stan, and the In dian Ocean. But their ac tions have been prompted by
trans at lan tic or Eu ro pean Un ion sol i dar i ties, not by those na tions’ his tor i cal in -
ter ests and com mit ments. Ger many, aside from sup port ing ac tively its in dus try
abroad, has no dis tant stra te gic is sues that would jus tify pro ject ing its forces
out side of an al lied op er a tion. The same is true for Spain and Italy, but not for
Britian and France.
As re cent op er a tions have shown, France and the United King dom keep im -
por tant bases over seas and are com mit ted by strings of mil i tary agree ments. Cy -
prus has proved to be a key po si tion for pro ject ing Brit ish forces to the Mid dle
East and far ther out to Af ghan i stan. Like wise, the French DOM-TOM—the na -
tion’s over seas de part ments and ter ri to ries—can play the role of “fixed air craft
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car ri ers” and ef fec tively pro vide French forces with lo gis tic bases across the
globe. Brit ish gar ri sons are main tained on As cen sion Is land, Cy prus, Diego Gar -
cia, and the Falklands, and in Belize, Brunei, Can ada, Ger many, Gi bral tar, Kenya, 
and Qa tar. De spite the 1967 with drawal, Brit ain re mains com mit ted in East Asia
by the Five Power De fense Ar range ments signed in 1971, whereby the United
King dom, Aus tra lia, New Zea land, Ma lay sia, and Sin ga pore will con sult each
other in the event of ex ter nal ag gres sion against the lat ter two. The Brit ish mil i -
tary can re cruit per son nel among the Com mon wealth na tions, and Brit ish ser -
vice men serve in other Com mon wealth armed forces. France has mil i tary
agree ments with Cam er oon, the Cen tral Af ri can Re pub lic, Como ros,  Dji bouti, 
Ga bon, the Ivory Coast, Ku wait, Qa tar, Sen e gal, Togo, and the United Arab
Emirates. A tra di tional player in the Ara bian Pen in sula, with its mil i tary links to
Oman, Brit ain is closely matched there by France, which has a pres ence in
Dji bouti—on the Horn of Af rica—and in a newly es tab lished na val and air base
in the United Arab Emirates. Sim i larly, Brit ain re tains a de fense com mit ment in
Belize, to de ter Gua te mala’s am bi tions, while France is an ac tive part ner in the
West In dies, with na val units based in Martinique that par tic i pate along side the
oc ca sional Brit ish frig ate in the U.S.-led antidrug ef fort. France and the United
King dom have in ter vened to gether in such dis tant the aters as East Timor. Lon -
don re mains com mit ted to the de fense of the Falkland Is lands, while Guyane
makes of France a South Amer i can neigh bor. 
A FRAME WORK FOR A CLOSER NA VAL RE LA TION
For all those rea sons, a closer Franco-Brit ish na val co op er a tion makes sense. The 
Royal Navy and the Ma rine Nationale are the two larg est na vies in Eu rope, and
they have had for de cades a com mon goal of work ing to gether. If it were not for
the sad mem o ries of Mers-el-Kébir—when a re luc tant Brit ish ad mi ral was sum -
moned by Winston Chur chill to at tack the fleet of an ally who had been forced
into an ar mi stice by the stun ning de feat of its army—and its af ter math, the two
na vies would have re mained at peace ever since Na po le onic times. For most of
those years, the two na vies have sailed in neigh bor ing wa ters, solv ing prob lems
to gether. They have also fought five wars as al lies, in clud ing three to gether with
the United States.
As Cap tain Gauthier ex plains, “The re la tion to the United States is at the
heart of the Franco-Brit ish na val co op er a tion.” First, the ref er ence to Amer ica
en ables France to cel e brate its last ma jor na val vic tory, at Ches a peake Bay in
1781, giv ing a con ve nient re sponse for Brit ain’s an nual Tra fal gar com mem o ra -
tion, where French of fi cers have to out wit their for mer foes. Sec ond, the re la tion
to the U.S. Navy is strong in both. As Gauthier puts it, each feels like “an older ju -
nior brother of the U.S. Navy.” The Royal Navy can bol ster the “spe cial
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re la tion ship” that ex ists be tween these two coun tries sep a rated by a com mon
lan guage. Brit ain has al ways taken pride in its abil ity to in flu ence the United
States. In that con nec tion, the Brit ish dip lo matic rep re sen ta tion in Wash ing ton
is about ten times more nu mer ous than the French. Nev er the less, grat i tude to
La fay ette, de Grasse, and Rochambeau and, more re cently, sixty years of close
na val co op er a tion, es pe cially in na val avi a tion, have forged deep connections
between the navies of the American and French republics.
If Ar gen tina’s suc cess ful French-made Exocet mis siles caused pop u lar re sent -
ment in the United King dom dur ing the 1982 Falklands War, Lon don’s de fense
sec re tary at the time praised Paris for its role: “In so many ways [Pres i dent
François] Mitterrand and the French were our great est al lies,” wrote Sir John
Nott. France made avail able to Brit ain Super Étendard and Mi rage air craft so
that Har rier pi lots and Royal Navy ships could train against them. Nott also
praised the co op er a tion with the French se cret ser vice that had pro duced “a re -
mark able world wide op er a tion to pre vent fur ther Exocets be ing bought by Ar -
gen tina,” most no ta bly from Peru, Bue nos Ai res’s stra te gic part ner. In con trast,
Nott ex pressed dis ap point ment at the pres sure from the White House and the
U.S. State De part ment to ne go ti ate: “They could not un der stand that to us any
ne go ti ated set tle ment would have seemed like de feat.”3 If Nott ac knowl edged
the role of Sec re tary of De fense Caspar Weinberger in sup ply ing vi tal Side -
winder air-to-air mis siles to the Brit ish, he seemed dis en chanted with the “spe -
cial re la tion ship”: “For all Mar ga ret Thatcher’s friend ship with Ron ald Rea gan,
he re mained a West Coast Amer i can look ing south to Latin Amer ica and west to
the Pa cific. Some times, I won dered if he even knew or cared where Eu rope was.”
The Brit ish re cap ture of the Falklands—a very close call—re mains the de fin ing
ac com plish ment that to this day jus ti fies pro cur ing air craft carriers and
amphibious ships. Despite (or thanks to) the Exocet, it also showed the value of
French support.
In the past fif teen years the Franco-Brit ish na val re la tion has been fur ther
strength ened. As a for mer de fense attaché in Lon don, Vice Ad mi ral Yann
Tainguy ex plains, “It is with the Royal Navy that the French Navy has the most
struc tured re la tion to work ef fec tively.” In 1996, in Saint-Malo, the com mand ers
in chief of both na vies signed a let ter of in tent that set up the frame work for this
struc tured na val re la tion. The agree ment cov ers a wide range of ac tiv i ties in -
clud ing op er a tions, and twenty for mal work ing groups have been es tab lished
un der the di rec tion of the Brit ish and French chiefs of na val staff. They cover fu -
ture air craft car rier de vel op ment, op er a tional plan ning, train ing be tween sur -
face fleets, sub ma rines, na val avi a tion, com mu ni ca tions, per son nel ex changes,
am phib i ous op er a tions, and an ti sub ma rine, antiair, and antisurface war fare
doc trine. An op er a tions cell at the Com mander-in-Chief Fleet head quar ters at
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North wood is manned by French of fi cers to fa cil i tate li ai son and co op er a tion
with the French Navy.4 
The in tent of the agree ment was to es tab lish ef fec tive co op er a tion at the
work ing level be tween the two na vies, mainly among midlevel of fi cers. The
work ing groups meet ev ery year, usu ally in the af ter math of a rugby match be -
tween the two na vies—a con test won by the French side in 2010. Peo ple meet
and fol low a road map for their dis cus sions. The na vies ex change their op er a -
tional pro grams, al though they do not yet have coordinated burden sharing.
The di a logue has some times stum bled on the specificities of both na vies. For
in stance, France has tried to push the re la tions in terms of com mon train ing.
France and Ger many have de vel oped a joint ed u ca tion sys tem for four to five
young of fi cers who spend five years in the other na tion fin ish ing their sec ond ary 
stud ies and grad u at ing from the na val acad emy. France and It aly also trade spe -
cific courses for of fi cers and petty of fi cers. With the United King dom, how ever,
com mon train ing and na val ed u ca tion have proved so far nearly im pos si ble, be -
cause its sys tem of ed u ca tion is en tirely dif fer ent. Brit ish na val of fi cers are re -
cruited af ter uni ver sity. Ba sic na val ed u ca tion lasts only about forty weeks be fore 
stu dents earn ac cess to their first po si tions as na val of fi cers. The best are later re -
trained to pre pare them for lon ger ca reers with the ap pro pri ate qual i fi ca tions.
The French sys tem re mains based on the “Grande École” con cept; grad u ates of
the na val acad emy are ex pected to serve full ca reers, with the con se quence that
French ju nior of fi cers are usu ally over qual i fied for their first as sign ments. The
Brit ish sys tem is more open—the first diploma does not matter so much. Forty
weeks of training provide the basic seamanship required. 
When France held the pres i dency of the Eu ro pean Un ion (EU), it tried to es -
tab lish a mil i tary-ed u ca tion ex change sim i lar to the Eras mus study-abroad sys -
tem that ex ists among Eu ro pean uni ver si ties. It worked well with Ger many, It aly, 
and Spain; it failed with the United King dom. The plugs just did not fit; the ed u -
ca tion sys tems were too dif fer ent. Cap tain Philip Sto nor, the Brit ish as sis tant
defense attaché in Paris, concurs: 
We have the chal lenge of sim i lar but dif fer ent ap proaches to the same cul ture. We are 
broadly the same peo ple, we have the same mo ti va tions but we think in dif fer ent
ways: the Bac ca lau re ate scheme is very Jac o bin, very Car te sian: you are told what to
do; most fit in; but some don’t—that is not Brit ish who tend to like di ver sity. The
French sys tem tends to be elit ist. But what’s the point of hav ing an elite: does it make
things work better? The Brit ish sys tem is based on a looser more in ter ac tive base with 
a prag matic ap proach. If you want to join the Navy, they tell you, go to sea, not sit in
a class room—that way you will learn what you need to do not how you should do it
if you ever get out of the class room.5 
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The com bat train ing and qual i fi ca tion sys tem of the Royal Navy is very de -
mand ing, and Brit ain would not wish to par al lel the French, Span ish, or Ital ian
equiv a lents to cer tify Her Maj esty’s ships. On the other hand, France takes ad -
van tage of the Brit ish sys tem. The Ma rine Nationale par tic i pates in the sec ond
level of the JOINT WARRIOR ex er cises, which take place in Scot land. French sub -
ma rines at tend Perisher, the submariners’ com mand course, and the two si lent
ser vices ex change of fi cers.
Al though all ex pec ta tions have not been ful filled, the Saint-Malo mech a nism
has proved so sat is fac tory that the two na tions’ ar mies and air forces fol lowed
this path, sign ing sim i lar agree ments in 1997–98.6 More over, in ef fect the 1996
na val agree ment has been re ca pit u lated at the po lit i cal level. The two min is ters
of de fense have al ways asked to be briefed on this co op er a tion, which remains
political in essence. 
In this con text, the past de cade has put the Franco-Brit ish re la tion ship to a
test. Pres i dent Jacques Chirac’s op po si tion to the Amer i can-Brit ish in ter ven tion 
in Iraq pro voked a split and a mis un der stand ing not only in trans at lan tic re la -
tions but also in cross-Channel di plo macy. IRAQI FREEDOM caused a deep rift
be tween the al lies. Mil i tary re la tions be tween the United States and France were
nearly sus pended, and gen eral of fi cers of each ceased to travel to the other coun -
try. The sit u a tion did not get to that point be tween the French and Brit ish mil i -
tar ies, but the flow of in for ma tion was con sid er ably re duced. As a con se quence,
co op er a tion be came more dif fi cult and France was barred from learn ing the
very im por tant op er a tional les sons of the mil i tary op er a tions un der way in Iraq. 
Ever since, both mil i tar ies have known dis tinct paths of evo lu tion. The
French Navy has re mained more vis i ble than the Royal Navy, whose sea go ing
role has been shad owed by ground op er a tions and bad luck. While train ing the
born-again Iraqi navy on the Shatt al Arab and pro tect ing a vi tal Iraqi off shore
plat form, a Royal Navy de tach ment was cap tured by Ira nian Pasdarans dur ing
the Easter va ca tion. This was sim ply a mat ter of poor tim ing, but the in ci dent
served poorly the im age of the ser vice at a time of bud get ary dis cus sion. The
usual de trac tors ques tioned the use ful ness of Royal Navy mis sions such as those
that had led to this embarrassment.
On the other hand, the Royal Ma rines built up their ex pe ri ence and in flu ence
by tak ing a ma jor role in the Iraq war. They out num ber by far the French na val
com man dos and Fu si liers Marins, and they con sti tute a def i nite spe cial iza tion
of the Royal Navy ground ca pa bil ity that does not ex ist in France, where the
Troupes de Ma rine be long to the Army.
De spite the 2003 split over Iraq, Paris and Lon don worked very hard for the
cre ation in 2004 of a Eu ro pean De fence Agency (EDA). At the po lit i cal level the
main dif fer ence be tween the two coun tries lay with the French po si tion
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re gard ing Eu rope. France sup ports the view that Eu rope should de velop ca pa bil -
i ties to con duct global mil i tary op er a tions of its own. Brit ain and the Royal Navy 
have al ways had an in cli na tion to ward the Amer i can “spe cial re la tion ship.” The
United King dom has al ways con sid ered any du pli ca tion of ex ist ing NATO ca pa -
bil i ties as a waste of re sources. Paris views Eu rope’s Com mon Se cu rity and De -
fence Pol icy (CSDP) as hav ing a better chance to ad dress global is sues than
NATO, with its Amer i can di men sion. Lon don feels un easy about com bin ing the
CSDP with NATO, while the United States has put for ward the three Ds: no du -
pli ca tion, no de coup ling from the United States or NATO, and no dis crim i na -
tion against non-EU mem bers, such as Tur key.
The pur pose of EDA is “to sup port the Mem ber States and the Coun cil in
their ef fort to im prove Eu ro pean de fence ca pa bil i ties in the field of cri sis man -
age ment and to sus tain the Eu ro pean Se cu rity and De fence Pol icy as it stands
now and de vel ops in the fu ture.”7 Un like NATO, EDA has a bot tom-up ap -
proach. The idea is an or ga ni za tion with con cen tric cir cles and dif fer ent lev els of 
en try that would re flect the lev els of in ter est of new mem bers and in vest ments
that they would be ready to make. De pend ing on in ter est and their fi nan cial pos -
si bil i ties, mem bers would pro ceed to ward the in ner cir cle of coun tries fully
com mit ted to de vel op ing a cer tain type of equip ment. In this re spect, Brit ain
and France seem to be the two most committed of the larger members of EDA.
The pur pose of EDA is to help de velop a mil i tary in dus trial base and a mil i -
tary ca pa bil ity that can be used to serve the Eu ro pean Un ion’s strat egy and the
CSDP, which was cre ated in the af ter math of the Chirac-Blair meet ing in
Saint-Malo in 1998.
From a Brit ish per spec tive, the core of this ef fort has been sup ported by
France and the United Kingdom. Ger many is also a very im por tant mem ber, but
the ques tion has al ways been whether Ger many would go all the way to de ploy -
ing troops. As a re sult of Op er a tion ARTEMIS in the Dem o cratic Re pub lic of the
Congo, Eu ro pean na tions have con tem plated a per ma nent force that would be
ready for de ploy ment at any time, like EURFOR, EUROMARFOR, or the
Franco-Ger man Bri gade.8 So far, the prob lem has re mained at the na tional level.
Some na tions are ready to com mit troops and ships but will not pay the costs.
Other na tions can not be trusted, be cause they may back down for po lit i cal rea -
sons.9 From a French per spec tive, how ever, Paris has al ways tried to pro mote the
cre ation of a Eu ro pean Un ion struc ture for plan ning and joint op er a tions, while
Brit ain has re sisted du pli cat ing an ex ist ing NATO ca pa bil ity.
THE QUEST FOR THE HOLY GRAIL OF INDUSTRIAL SYNERGIES
In an ideal world Brit ish and French na val in dus tries should be merged, be cause
the two na vies’ needs are iden ti cal: air craft car ri ers, stra te gic sub ma rines,
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nu clear at tack sub ma rines, an ti air craft de stroy ers, gen eral-pur pose frig ates,
am phib i ous as sault ships, and sea go ing re plen ish ment ships. Both Brit ish and
French stan dards for acous tic si lenc ing are much stricter than those of other Eu -
ro pean na tions. In that sense, an ideal con sol i da tion of Eu ro pean na val ship -
build ing might in clude Brit ain join ing France, on the one hand, with Ger many
merg ing its ca pa bil i ties with It aly’s, on the other hand. Still, this will most likely
never happen.
One French par tic i pant re fuses to view the ter mi na tion in 1999 of the Ho ri -
zon air-de fense de stroyer pro gram as a fail ure: “Put the Type 45 Dar ing [(D32),
the first Type 45 unit] and the Forbin [(D620), French lead ship of the Ho ri zon
class] side by side: they just look alike and share the same weapon sys tem. We
worked very hard to have a com mon weapon sys tem and un for tu nately we were
not able to agree on the com bat sys tem. But this is cer tainly not a fail ure: we cre -
ated a wealth of con tacts and re la tions that have been ex tremely use ful for the in -
dus try and that could be re ac ti vated at will.” Through the Ho ri zon pro gram
France learned to write de tailed spec i fi ca tions and con tracts. In the past, past
navy-mil i tary pro cure ment pro ce dures were very sim ple, with the navy putt ing
its re quire ments very briefly—two hun dred pages for the La Fayette frig ates.
With the Ho ri zon writ ten spec i fi ca tions, of six thou sand pages, the French Navy
trans formed its re la tions with the in dus try. Aside from this learn ing ex pe ri ence,
co op er a tion on war ship pro grams is al ways dif fi cult, be cause of le git i mate na -
tional con cerns about safe guard ing ex per tise, jobs, and ship yards. But some in
France think that both coun tries could have gone farther. Cooperation on
Horizon was rocked by a series of difficulties.
For one, the in dus trial part ners did not have the same sta tus: the then Di rec -
tor ate for Na val Con struc tion (now DCNS) was part of the French state, whereas 
GEC, its Brit ish coun ter part, was not a ship yard and be longed to the BAE aero -
space group. Some on the French side felt that GEC was un fa mil iar with the na -
val do main. More over, the Brit ish na val in dus try was in trou ble, hav ing been
un able to re struc ture and cut down the num ber of its ship yards. More nu mer -
ous and smaller yards meant du pli ca tion and a smaller crit i cal mass that did not
fit the am bi tious re search and de vel op ment (R&D) effort required for the
Horizon program.
The na tional cal en dars di verged. With Masurca air-de fense mis siles reach -
ing the end of their lives and the SM-1 Tar tar be ing less ca pa ble of de feat ing
cruise mis siles, France ini tially wanted its Ho ri zon antiair de stroy ers by 2004
and had to or der them in 1998. The Brit ish had al ready de cided to stretch the
lives of the Type 42s and had planned to or der their Ho ri zon de stroy ers only in
2000.
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The part ners were overoptimistic as to the num bers they could af ford. Brit ain 
wanted twelve units, It aly pre tended to buy six, and France had planned on four
(to re place al to gether the two Suffren and the two Cassard frig ates), for a grand
to tal of twenty-two. Only ten—four Ho ri zon and six Type 45—will come out in
the end.
Rolls-Royce’s TR21 gas tur bine was se lected, but it would not be ready in time 
for the French pro gram.
France and It aly wanted the Eu ro pean Multifunction Phased Ar ray Ra dar
(EMPAR), while the Brit ish side sup ported its own Sampson (an “ac tive elec -
tron i cally scanned ar ray” ra dar be ing de vel oped by BAE Sys tems). Ac tu ally Brit -
ain was ready to spend more on its R&D, be cause ex per tise had been lost due to
fi nan cial re stric tions un der Mar ga ret Thatcher. Lon don was hop ing to in stall
the Sampson on all twenty-two ships.
At first, Brit ain was un cer tain about the mis sile it self. Go ing with As ter
would close the door for the SM-3 and Tom a hawk, two im por tant weap ons
for their antitactical-bal lis tic-mis sile and land-at tack ca pa bil i ties. The SM-3
and Tom a hawk re quired a broader hull. Al though the Brit ish did choose
Aster, with its sixty-four-cell Sil ver ver ti cal launch sys tem (VLS), de signed
by DCN, the Type 45 is broader than the Franco-Ital ian Ho ri zon and could
even tu ally ac com mo date, with mod i fi ca tions, the Mark 41 VLS with SM-3
and Tom a hawk.
The com bat-man age ment sys tem (CMS) seemed, how ever, to have been the
main ob sta cle. Both France and the United King dom wanted to take the lead for
the CMS. Ini tial trou ble with the Type 23 CMS had led Brit ain to show an in ter -
est in the French CMS, owned by DCN. Be ing a pub lic com pany, DCN could not
head the over all pro gram con sor tium but wanted to lead the CMS. GEC claimed
the lead er ship, while the French part ner felt that it was more ex pe ri enced in this
par tic u lar area. Trans fer ring DCN’s know-how on CMS to GEC, a po ten tial
com pet i tor, would not be profitable for France.
In the end, Ho ri zon and its half brother the Type 45 re flect dif fer ent phi los o -
phies and cul tures. France ac cepts a ship into its navy when its weap ons and sys -
tems have been in te grated, tried, and cer ti fied. Hav ing an avi a tion cul ture, BAE
fa vored an in cre men tal pro cess, as for air craft pro to types. The first Type 45 was
com mis sioned with its main ra dar un tested and with out an elec tronic war fare
suite. Sampson was first tried on the test ing barge Long bow in 2009, when Daring
was al ready in com mis sion. In stead of a CMS, it car ries a com mand-and-con trol
sys tem ca pa ble of han dling the Prin ci pal Anti-Air Mis sile Sys tem. Ear lier, the
Type 23 frig ates also lacked com bat-man age ment sys tems at the be gin nings of
their lives.
S H E L D O N - D U P L A I X 8 7
9
Sheldon-Duplaix: Franco-British Relations at Sea and Overseas
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
De spite its ter mi na tion, the Ho ri zon pro gram cre ated a mo men tum that the
two coun tries tried to use for their air craft car rier pro grams. Po lit i cally, then-
pres i dent Jacques Chirac wanted co op er a tion with Brit ain. The choice of con -
ven tional gas tur bines in stead of nu clear pro pul sion (as in Charles de Gaulle)
made by an interministerial com mit tee proved the French de sire to pave the way
to ward a com mon de sign. The French car rier would still have had to pro duce ad -
di tional steam for its cat a pults (which the Queen Eliz a beths were not sup posed to
have at first), but the com mit tee had con cluded that it was best to have a larger car -
rier than Charles de Gaulle, be cause fu ture planes would be larger. This also ex -
plains why the Franco-Brit ish de sign dis places sixty thou sand tons and why
Charles de Gaulle’s pro pul sion plant would not be pow er ful enough for a nu clear
vari ant of what would have been France’s much-larger num ber-two car rier.
The air craft car rier cul tures of the two na tions proved sur pris ingly dis tinct.
In France the air craft car rier is a war ship in it self. The cap tain is in charge of
both the plat form and the air group and di rects all op er a tions. In the United
King dom two sep a rate worlds co ex ist, the plat form and the air group. Each
world has its own op er a tional life, and there are two hi er ar chies, one for the ship
and one for the air group. This ex plains why the Brit ish car rier de sign has two is -
lands, with com bat in for ma tion centers in both islands.
The Brit ish no tion that air op er a tions can be dis tinct from the ship’s op er a -
tions is seen as her esy on the other side of the Chan nel. Cap tain Sto nor ac knowl -
edges this dif fer ence: “We have yet to find the happy bal ance be tween the RAF
[Royal Air Force] way of op er at ing and Naval pro ce dures. There are two big dif -
fer ences: RAF are very re luc tant to do non-di ver sion ary flights when em barked;
and the RAF has yet [to] be con vinced of the ad van tages of ‘hot re fu el ing.’ No
doubt for their own good rea sons they don’t want to do things the Na val way.”10
Not with stand ing this philo soph i cal dif fer ence, the Brit ish ar chi tec ture has its 
ad van tages. An ten nas have to be set apart any way to avoid prob lems of elec tro -
mag netic in com pat i bil ity. The two-is lands con cept is also better for sur viv abil -
ity in case of a hit.
The French side ar gued that build ing the three hulls (i.e., two Brit ish, one
French) in Saint-Nazaire would halve the over all costs, but Brit ain could not let
down its own ship yards. In the end both sides made con ces sions, and the fi nal
de sign showed a com mon al ity of about 80 per cent. This meant sig nif i cant sav -
ing, but once again the po lit i cal tem pos did not match. In 2006, one year be fore
the French pres i den tial elec tions, Lon don was not ready to or der. When Brit ain
gave its go-ahead, the French elec tions were a cou ple of months away and Paris
could not fol low suit. The newly elected Nicolas Sarkozy post poned his de ci sion
to 2011–12, a move that was con firmed in June 2010. Ev ery thing is still pos si ble,
but the synergy is lost, at least partially.
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NEW OP POR TU NI TIES OUT OF DIF FI CULT TIMES
Al though the “spe cial re la tion ship” was put to the test back in 2003 in Iraq,
where the Amer i can ally did not lis ten to Brit ish con cerns over the lack of post -
war plan ning, it re mains prof it able for Brit ain. As a Brit ish source com ments,
“The best way for the United States to deal with Eu rope is to use Brit ain as a tool
to ap ply pres sure in re turn for the Brit ish do ing their bid ding with the Eu ro pe -
ans. The Brit ish view is: it is a has sle to go through the US Con gress etc. . . . but in
the end, the net gain is su pe rior: we are better off. And this is cur rently mak ing
Brit ain ret i cent towards working closer with Europe.”
Like the French Navy, the Royal Navy is go ing through dif fi cult times. The de -
fense fo cus and al lo ca tions are go ing to ground and air op er a tions. Un like their
fa ther, un cles, and grandun cles, the royal princes are serv ing in the Brit ish Army
and not in the Royal Navy. The sea ser vice awaits the forth com ing 2010 stra te gic
de fense re view with anx i ety, hop ing that its car rier-based navy con cept will be
re af firmed. The army and the RAF are against the car ri ers, which com pete for
fund ing with their ground op er a tions. But as Cap tain Sto nor ex plains, “The Ice -
lan dic vol cano [i.e., the erup tions that in ter mit tently dis rupted Eu ro pean air
traf fic be gin ning in April 2010] has shown that geo graph i cally fixed air bases
have, as we al ways knew, se ri ous lim i ta tions. The value of the car rier re mains in -
tact; more over, in Af ghan i stan, the Al lies still use the car ri ers to sup port ground
op er a tions and we are wait ing for the Charles de Gaulle at the end of this year.”
Cap tain Gauthier be lieves that those dif fi cul ties cre ate a win dow of op por tu -
nity for Brit ish-French na val co op er a tion: 
Brit ish prag ma tism should ac knowl edge that the de fense pos ture of both na tions is
closely in ter de pen dent: we share the same fate. The fact that our two na vies op er ate
the whole spec trum of plat forms from air craft car ri ers to stra te gic sub ma rines and
am phib i ous as sault ships means that if one na tion loses one of those com po nents, the 
other na tion will lose a jus ti fi ca tion to re tain it: its pub lic opin ion will not un der -
stand why this com po nent is still valid if its neigh bor has done away with it. There -
fore, both na tions have to sup port each oth er. Ev ery thing is pos si ble and ev ery thing
can be lost.11
The Brit ish de fense re view has an nounced fur ther cuts that should give an in -
cen tive to ex plore mu tu ally ad van ta geous co op er a tion. Even the To ries now ac -
knowl edge that Brit ain can not pro duce all it needs for its de fense. Cap tain
Sto nor be lieves that there is “a lot to be gained to try to move to wards a Brit ish-
French re search and de vel op ment ef fort that Eu rope has yet to pro duce.” In his
view it would be well to go along with the lines en vis aged by Prime Min is ter
Da vid Cameron and Pres i dent Sarkozy.
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The car rier is sue is of par a mount im por tance to both na vies. Clearly the fu -
ture of the Royal Navy is at stake. For both Brit ain and France it is also a mat ter
of cred i bil ity in their part ner ship with the United States. The con struc tion of
Queen Eliz a beth II, Brit ain’s first of the new car rier class, is mov ing fast. But the
pros pects for the F-35B short-take off-ver ti cal-land ing (STOVL) air craft un der
de vel op ment are gloom ier ev ery day, with spi ral ing costs and a small number of
participants.
If the F-35B STOVL col lapses, the F-35C CTOL (con ven tional take off and
land ing) or the F-18 would be likely choices for Brit ain. France might har bor
some hopes for the Rafale, es pe cially if Brazil takes it for its own car rier. Through 
EADS, France is also a part ner in the Eurofighter. Mak ing a na val ver sion of the
lat ter might prove too ex pen sive. In any case, the re turn to a CTOL car rier im -
plies for the Royal Navy a ne ces sity to re learn skills that the United King dom
orig i nally in tro duced in car rier avi a tion. Cap tain Sto nor con sid ers that Prince of 
Wales, the sec ond car rier, could if re quired still be fit ted with a cat a pult, most
likely electromagnetic. 
This de ci sion will bring the two na tions back to a sim i lar car rier de sign,
open ing the door for fur ther co op er a tion. Sug ges tions have been made that the
two na tions could share one of the two Brit ish car ri ers. But they don’t seem
prac ti cal. The United King dom will need to train its pi lots, and France might be
a closer and cheaper op tion than send ing them to the United States. Charles de
Gaulle has dem on strated its abil ity to co op er ate closely with U.S. air craft car ri -
ers. Dur ing re cent ex changes, French Rafales have had their en gines re moved
and re placed by French air craft main te nance teams de ployed on Amer i can air -
craft car ri ers. There is per haps a fu ture for tri lat eral Amer i can-Brit ish-French
co op er a tion on car ri ers. Brit ain might want the French to train their flight-deck
personnel, and the United States might view that favorably.
Brit ain has im proved six of its thir teen Type 23 an ti sub ma rine frig ates,
thanks to the Thales Group’s French-made Type 2087 towed pas sive ar ray. Col -
lab o ra tion with France on Brit ain’s Fu ture Sur face Com bat ant seems un likely,
though. On pa per, the Type 26’s spec i fi ca tions are closely sim i lar to those of
the DCNS’s FREMM multimission frig ate. But for in dus trial rea sons, Brit ain
has de cided to go its own way and turn down a pro posal to join the Franco-
Ital ian de sign. Brit ain will not buy As ter 15 ei ther. In stead, a new short-range
air-de fense mis sile will be de vel oped with MBDA, the mul ti na tional mis sile-
sys tems group. The logic is com mer cial. The United King dom is will ing to of -
fer the Type 26 for ex port. If the Brit ish had put As ter 15 on Type 26, they
would have had the in con ve nience of seek ing French and Ital ian ap proval be -
fore ex port ing the ship. The Type 26s will also carry Tom a hawk land-at tack
cruise mis siles, a log i cal step given that the Royal Navy would not want to have
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two dif fer ent types of cruise mis siles in its in ven tory if it were to buy France’s
SCALP na val air-launched cruise mis sile.
France’s full re in te gra tion within NATO should fa vor the de vel op ment of Eu -
ro pean interoperable sys tems. It may find a com mon ground with Brit ain
through EDA. In the re place ment of their re plen ish ment ships, so far Brit ain
and France are go ing their own ways. In mine-coun ter mea sures ves sels, there is a 
po ten tial area of co op er a tion, both na tions hav ing con sid er able ex pe ri ence. For
drones, France and Brit ain could co op er ate, but BAE has clearly chosen the
United States as its partner.
On the op er a tional side, co op er a tion has al ways been eas ier. As Cap tain
Gauthier ex plains, “We don’t al ways have interoperable sys tems but we do in te -
grate our forces. At sea you have less bor ders and more char ac ter.” NATO has al -
ways been the base for Franco-Brit ish na val co op er a tion. As a mat ter of fact, the
re turn of France to the NATO mil i tary or ga ni za tion has been trans par ent for the 
Ma rine Nationale, which works on a daily basis with NATO procedures.
For both Brit ain and France, the op er a tional pri or ity is to re tain their skills.
The dan ger is the fo cus on cer tain mis sions that dis tract both na vies from prac -
tic ing and re tain ing some of their im por tant skills, such as an ti sub ma rine war -
fare. So far, ex changes for na val train ing have not worked prop erly. Sources in
the French na val in dus try see a com mer cial ob sta cle. Un like in France, the
United King dom’s na val ed u ca tion is be ing run by a pri vate com pany named
Flag ship, which be longs to BAE, a com pet i tor of DCNS. From that per spec tive,
the lack of train ing ex changes may ex plain the dif fi cul ties en coun tered in de vel -
op ing joint pro grams. Cap tain Sto nor main tains, how ever, that the main chal -
lenge is cultural and not commercial.
De spite those lim i ta tions on train ing ex changes, each coun try has had, for the 
past years, seven or eight ex change of fi cers in the other navy. As Cap tain
Gauthier ex plains, “This is a high mark of mu tual con fi dence to en trust the
watch of a ma jor war ship to a for eign of fi cer: it cre ates a net work of peo ple who
know each other and keep in touch to fa cil i tate mu tual un der stand ing while
they grow up.” The French and Brit ish na vies are also each pro vid ing a frig ate to
es cort the other na tion’s aircraft carrier during deployments.
An other op por tu nity came out of an em bar rass ment. The Brit ish and French
nu clear bal lis tic-mis siles sub ma rines Van guard and Triomphant col lided in the
At lan tic on 3 Feb ru ary 2009. (Both were sub merged and, ac cord ing to Brit ain’s
Min is try of De fence, mov ing “at very low speed.”) The ac ci dent made it clear
that the two coun tries did not co or di nate their un der wa ter stra te gic pa trols, a
fact that Com mo dore Ste phen Saunders, the ed i tor of Jane’s Fight ing Ships, crit i -
cized harshly, given the pos si ble con se quences.12 In ter viewed by jour nal ists, the
French de fense min is ter sug gested that both coun tries could “think about their
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pa trol zones.”13 Re cent talks are said to have in cluded the idea of “shar ing de ter -
rence,” al though this may prove po lit i cally too sen si tive.14 
On the (met a phor i cal) ground, Brit ish and French forces—in clud ing the na vies
—are again fight ing side by side. French na val com man dos were ac tive in Af -
ghan i stan un til 2007, when Pres i dent Chirac de cided on their with drawal.
French na val avi a tion has been in volved on the Afghan the ater, with at tack air craft
—Super Étendards and Rafales—and air borne-early-warn ing Hawkeyes op er -
at ing from Charles de Gaulle or from land dur ing the car rier’s yard pe riod. The
Min is try of De fence in the United King dom is ex pe ri enc ing the stress of
long-term ground op er a tions that have been moved from the Iraqi to the Afghan 
battlegrounds, with ten thou sand troops en gaged in a tough prov ince. France
has smaller forces in Af ghan i stan, with 3,500. France’s con tin gent has now gone
from the Kabul area to a risk ier zone, where it is tak ing ca su al ties. Sadly, shar ing
losses also strengthens bonds.
France plays an ac tive role in the antipiracy mis sion off So ma lia. For the
Royal Navy, given the lim ited num ber of its plat forms, the pi racy mis sion was
not a pri or ity, but its com mand-and-con trol con tri bu tion is praised. Un der
Rear Ad mi ral Philip Jones, the com mand cen ter at North wood has been cred ited 
with do ing a re mark able job in di rect ing ATALANTA, the EU op er a tion against
pi racy off the Horn of Af rica. 
The United King dom and France are sep a rated by the Chan nel wherein they
work to gether. Un like France, Brit ain has a ded i cated coast guard ser vice—the
Mar i time and Coast guard Agency—and the Royal Navy does not share with the
Ma rine Nationale the mis sion of safe guard ing the mar i time do main. But the
coun tries char ter to gether, and share the op er at ing costs of, the tug Sea Mon arch
and are plan ning to gether for the se cu rity of the London 2012 Olympics.
{LINE-SPACE}
The past de cade has been tough for Franco-Brit ish na val re la tions, with a po lit i -
cal split over Iraq and with dif fer ing in dus trial and po lit i cal agen das that led to
the ter mi na tion of the co op er a tion on the Ho ri zon pro gram and a fail ure to
build three air craft car ri ers to gether. 
France and the United King dom have com mon in ter ests and ob jec tives, but
their re al iza tion is com pli cated by de ci sion-mak ing pro cesses that of ten do not
match the po lit i cal tem pos on ei ther side of the Chan nel. Uni fy ing the Eu ro pean 
na val land scape has proved im pos si ble so far, de spite a prom is ing ap proach
through the Eu ro pean Defence Agency. Thales and MBDA have been able to
merge the aero space sec tor, but the na val sec tor re mains very much a na tional
sym bol— there are no last ing and re li able al li ances when it co mes to cut ting the
metal to keep yards work ing.
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On the op er a tional side, co op er a tion has al ways been strong. As France’s last
na val attaché to Lon don sum ma rizes it, “Both na vies work well to gether. We
have built up a trust ing re la tion ship. We both know that we would sup port each
other in case of ne ces sity.” In French eyes, the Royal Navy re mains very pow er ful
and very ca pa ble. Its train ing is rig or ous, and the French Navy is ea ger to learn
from it. For Brit ain’s part, as the as sis tant de fense attaché in Paris notes, “within
Eu rope, the FR-UK naval relation is moving faster.”
At the time of this writ ing the Brit ish gov ern ment was con sid er ing cut ting
down the size of its fleet in or der to save at least one new car rier, with the sec ond
be ing ei ther con verted into a he li cop ter car rier, moth balled upon com ple tion,
or dis carded. The Tri dent re place ment plans should re main in tact. Those pros -
pects should en cour age the Royal Navy to in crease its interoperability with the
French Navy. Fit ting a cat a pult to one of the car riers could be part of that ef fort.
The car rier may re ceive the less ex pen sive CTOL ver sion of the F-35 and per haps 
have the ca pa bil ity to host the French Rafale and Amer i can F-18. Se nior Brit ish
of fi cers have al ready un der lined that fur ther re duc tion of the or der of bat tle
would force the Royal Navy to aban don cer tain mis sions, such as the Armilla pa -
trols in the Per sian Gulf and the Ca rib bean de ploy ments. 
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